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Abstract 
Concerns to setting an appropriate overall macroprudential policy framework have taken shape at local, regional, and 
global level since the onset of the global financial crisis. At regional level, a particular case is that of the European 
Union, given the national-supranational relationship specific to this economic region. The article aims to identify the 
macroprudential policy condition of the Euro Area candidate countries, by using an index built on some criteria that 
describe on the one hand, the capacity of macroprudential policy governance and the “activism” of macroprudential 
authority, and, on the other hand, the degree of compliance with the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) 
recommendations for national macroprudential authorities, given that the countries under review are member states of 
the European Union. Our findings show that the Euro Area candidate countries have quite different macroprudential 
policy features, both in terms of its governance and in terms of the “convergence” towards ESRB recommendations. 
Although the analysis should be extended by adding other relevant criteria, we can assert that it offers an overview of 
the potential role of the national macroprudential policy as a shock-absorber instrument in the perspective of a future 
accession to the Euro Area. 
Keywords: financial stability, macroprudential authority, central bank, monetary union, adjustment tool 
1. Introduction 
Macroprudential policy is becoming increasingly important due to changes following the global financial crisis, and the 
concerns to identifying an appropriate framework for this policy are show both at global level and regional/local level. 
The topic is even more relevant in the context of a currency area, especially if member states have a high degree of 
heterogeneity and the monetary policy is no longer a national instrument for adjustment local imbalances. 
Although many countries, especially those with emerging economies, have used macroprudential instruments before 
and already are quite experienced, they have not been concerned in setting up an institutional framework of this policy‟s 
implementation. The measures were rather quick responses of authorities‟ adaptation in case of shocks or in the 
conditions of financial crises, currency crises, etc. 
Worldwide, there are various institutional arrangements designed to include the macroprudential policy; the central 
bank is involved in this policy and in most cases plays the most important role. European Union Regulation no. 
1092/2010 states that the European Central Bank and the national central bank should play a leading role in 
macroprudential oversight. Furthermore, according to the Recommendation of the European Systemic Risk Board on 
the macroprudential mandate of national authorities (hereinafter, the “ESRB/2011/3”), the member states of the 
European Union (EU) are advised to ensure that the central bank plays a major role in macroprudential policy. In 
addition, its application must not affect the independence of the monetary authority, concordantly with Article 130 of 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU. 
Macroprudential policy is not only a tool to prevent the accumulation of vulnerable elements in the financial system, but 
also to correct some imbalances produced in macroeconomic terms. Implementing the national macroprudential policy 
is of a particular interest for a currency area. The significance of this policy is even greater if member states have a high 
degree of heterogeneity, as it could be used as macroeconomic instrument for adjusting local imbalances. 
Euro Area consists of countries whose business and financial cycles are not synchronized, and whose structural 
differences are quite large. Hence, the national macroprudential policy should be an important pillar of the local 
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macroeconomic framework, compensating to some extent for the loss of flexibility previously offered by the national 
monetary policy. 
Based on these remarks, we consider that the analysis of macroprudential policy features is an important research topic, 
especially in the case of EU countries and the Euro Area, given the national-supranational relationship specific to this 
economic and monetary region. In this context and under the conditions of preparation for euro adoption, in addition to 
pursuing a sustainable economic convergence (nominal and real), Euro Area candidate countries are challenged to set 
up a viable macroprudential policy. Moreover, the Euro Area candidate countries, namely Bulgaria, Croatia, Czechia, 
Hungary, Poland, and Romania, have certain specific characteristics, with economies integrated into EU structures, 
vulnerable to capital flows, with foreign-dominated banking systems, with a lower level of intermediation, which 
require separate treatment from Euro Area countries. For that matter, as Mérő & Piroska (2018) suggested, a 
reorganization of the Banking Union by reallocating macroprudential mandates as to involve these non-Euro Area 
countries, would have a positive impact on the financial stability across the EU. Progress has been made in this 
direction given that Bulgaria and Croatia have already joined the Banking Union on 1 October 2020. 
2. Paper Background 
There are many studies that address the topic of macroprudential policy, but the theoretical framework is still in its 
infancy and lags behind the practice, given that since the outbreak of the global financial crisis the world's economies 
have gone through a series of “crises” that require rapid decisions concerning the application of macroprudential 
measures. 
In recent years, the literature in this field has grown exponentially. Galati & Moessner (2011) review the literature on 
macroprudential policy, and Claessens (2015) presents an overview of macroprudential policy instruments. Issues such 
as the relationship between macroprudential policy and economic growth (Boar et al., 2017; Ma, 2020; Sánchez & 
Röhn, 2016) or the efficiency of using different macroprudential instruments (Lim et al., 2011; Poghosyan, 2019) are 
analysed. One of the necessary conditions for the application of these measures in an effective way is related to the 
coordination between macroprudential and monetary policy (Angeloni & Faia, 2013; Beau et al., 2012). 
The economic literature provides different results for the influence of macroprudential policies on economic growth. 
While it is sure enough that their implementation reduces the frequency of crises episodes or helps to make them less 
serious, it may come with an attenuation of growth in good times. Although they recognize that the macroprudential 
policy is rather a new instrument and its effects need more time to be correctly evaluated, Sánchez & Röhn (2016) 
suggested that making use of it allows avoiding extreme increases and in average is  coupled with lower growth. 
Recently, after applying a calibrated model, Ma (2020) concludes that when using macroprudential policies to 
strengthen financial stability, the associated effect is only a marginal loss for the economic growth, recommending as 
pertinent these policies. Boar et al. (2017) sussed out that a beneficial effect on economic growth (considering both the 
growth rate and its volatility) appear only when the macroprudential tools are currently used; this effect is also 
dependent on financial development and economic openness. The role of foreign direct investment for the economic 
growth is well known in the literature (Alfaro et al., 2010). This relation depends on income levels (Baiashvili & Gattini, 
2020) or is more evident in the long run in developing countries (Dinh et al., 2019) but also the increasing financial 
interconnections and capital flows (especially in Central and Eastern European countries) give rise to new challenges 
for macroprudential authorities. The peculiarities of some new European Union member states (members and 
non-members of the Euro Area) regarding macroeconomic indicators, sentiment, confidence and investor perception 
and foreign direct investment are discussed in Badea et al. (2018). 
There are also studies that address regional features of macroprudential policy. In this regard, Dumičić (2018) analyses 
the effectiveness of macroprudential measures applied in countries from Central and Eastern Europe, while Dimova et 
al. (2016) focus their analysis on countries from South-Eastern Europe. Recently, Budnik & Kleibl (2018) created an 
extensive database for EU countries (for the period 1995-2014) on macroprudential policy, applied instruments, 
objectives pursued, etc. 
Among the representative studies on the quantitative evaluation of macroprudential policy based on the construction of 
specific indicators are Lim et al. (2013), which quantifies the role of central banks and governments in the size and 
complexity of economies, and Cerutti et al. (2017), which analyses the evolution of credit growth in relation to 
macroprudential measures applied in 119 countries. Lombardi & Siklos (2016) develop the topic by proposing a broader 
assessment of the capacity to implement macroprudential policy. In this regard, the authors project a wider indicator 
addressing the issue based on two criteria: one on how to configure the framework of macroprudential policy, and 
another on the degree of convergence with the objectives set by the Group of 20 economies and the Financial Stability 
Board. 
Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2015) discuss the desirability of using macroprudential policy as an adjustment tool in a 
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monetary union, concluding that its application by Euro Area periphery countries can help reduce their macroeconomic 
imbalances, but that its effectiveness depends on decentralization. In other words, the macroprudential policy available 
to the member states is an adjustment tool in a monetary union. Therefore, increasing the capacity of national 
macroprudential policy, especially in countries belonging to supranational structures, such as the Euro Area, is a 
necessity and thus a topic of interest for research. 
Starting from these observations, the present article aims to identify condition of the national macroprudential policy for 
Euro Area candidate countries, achieving a ranking in terms of some features of the macroprudential policy. The 
research is motivated by the fact that with the accession to the Euro Area, an important instrument of macroeconomic 
adjustment, i.e. monetary policy, is lost, making it necessary to activate and strengthen national macroeconomic 
instruments, capable of restoring the balance of power. 
3. Area Descriptions 
Identifying the condition of macroprudential policy for a comparative analysis across countries is a complex task, 
including several areas, such as: the institutional profile given by the type of management, the sphere of responsibility 
of the authority, as well as by its decision-making power in this field; the operational profile for implementing 
macroprudential policy; the organizational profile of the central bank regarding the financial stability, etc.  
In practice, there are two types of macroprudential policy management: on the one hand, based on inter-institutional 
coordination, which involves pursuing the objective of financial stability through the use of the instruments and 
expertise of each authority involved, and on the other hand, a single management, entrusted to a single authority (either 
committee or central bank). The governance by an inter-institutional coordination can generate conflicting opinions and 
strategies (Ingves, 2011) and in addition can dilute accountability at the institution level, by relieving them of 
responsibility, shortcomings that can lead to inaction (Knot, 2014) or reaction delays in critical situations. Such 
leadership is associated with the risk of rivalry between conflicting institutions or conflicting mandates (Lim et al., 2013) 
that ultimately affects the process of ensuring the stability of the financial system. In the case of macroprudential policy 
management by a single institution, the regulatory arbitrage is reduced (Pan, 2010), the responsibility for risk 
identification and implementation of measures is more precise, the costs are lower (Anand et al., 2014), and the 
administrative organization is simpler. However, as Bengtsson (2019) mentions, an inter-institutional committee ensures 
the distribution of information between authorities and has a larger pool of human resources, and implicitly more 
specialists. 
Although there is no consensus on the optimal type of institutional arrangement for macroprudential policy, the 
resources, and the way in which the objectives involved are aligned are important in choosing the type of governance. 
In principle it is considered that, regardless of the option, the central bank should play a key role in driving 
macroprudential policy. The arguments in favour of this statement refer both to the synergy of the role of this authority 
in monetary and macroprudential policy (Bengtsson, 2019) and to the existence of a higher level of independence from 
other authorities over political influence, and to the availability of resources in systemic risk assessment. The central 
bank is qualified in the field of analysis and information on economic and financial activity; it is also well informed 
about the structures and developments of the financial market through the market operations it carries out and by 
monitoring the payment system. Besides, the central bank benefits from the technical apparatus for performing specific 
analyses. 
Based on these findings, we believe that a greater responsibility of the central bank than that of other institutions in the 
macroprudential field, with greater autonomy and a greater number of available macroprudential instruments, increases 
the capacity of this policy to act at national level. At the same time, macroprudential policy within the central bank can 
be a tool to compensate for the lack of national monetary policy that becomes supranational by joining the monetary 
union. Moreover, this is in line with the ESRB/2011/3 Recommendation that emphasize the fact that central banks 
should have a leading role in macroprudential policymaking. 
The achievement of the proposed objective is limited to some specific elements of macroprudential policy framework 
for the Euro Area candidate countries, namely: the capacity of macroprudential policy governance, the “activism” of 
macroprudential authority in using or assuming the ESRB instruments, and the degree of compliance with the 
ESRB/2011/3 Recommendation. 
4. Methods and Techniques 
The analysis is performed using an index on characteristics of macroprudential policy, built on the criteria mentioned in 
Section 3, in order to assess, on the one hand, the capacity of macroprudential policy governance, and the availability of 
instruments applied/assumed by the macroprudential authority, and, on the other hand, the degree of compliance with the 
ESRB's recommendations for national macroprudential authorities, given that the countries under review are member 
states of the European Union, and the “pattern” of national macroprudential policy should be as close as possible to that 
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resulting from the ESRB's recommendations. 
The capacity of macroprudential policy governance is defined here by two elements: the institutional arrangement, with or 
without a coordinating body, and the role of central bank in this governance; and the decision-making power (“hard”, 
“semi-hard” and “soft” power). 
The “activism” of macroprudential authority regarding the application or assumption of the ESRB instruments is reflected 
by the number of macroprudential instruments (according to the ESRB classification) used and/or assumed by the national 
authorities. There are nineteen instruments classified according to ESRB, excluding reciprocation measures: five capital 
buffers, five borrower-based measures, and nine other measures (see Table 5, in the Appendix). 
Details of the methods and technical aspects for these criteria are presented in Table 1 and Table 2.  
We start from the premise that a higher value of the index means a greater capacity of macroprudential policy to be used as 
a macroeconomic tool for managing financial crises.  
We consider that, in case of a coordinating body for conducting macroprudential policy, the governance capacity is 
affected if the central bank does not have a major role. On the other hand, in the absence of such a coordinating body, if 
central bank is the single institution responsible for macroprudential policy, the governance capacity is also affected. 
These specifications are found in the way of assigning values for sub-criteria of institutional arrangement (Table 1).  
 
Table 1. Procedure for evaluating the capacity of macroprudential policy governance 
I1 - Capacity of macroprudential policy governance Yes  No 
I11 - Institutional arrangement (coordinating body/no coordinating body) /  
 (I11)1 - Is there a financial stability/macroprudential coordinating body? 1 0 
 (I11)2 - Is the central bank a member? 1 0 
 (I11)3 - Does central bank chair coordination body? 1 0 
 (I11)4 - If no body - Does central bank share financial stability/macroprudential mandate? 1 0 
 (I11)5 - If no body - Is central bank sole owner of the mandate?  0 1 
 (I11)6 - If no body - is there implicit coordination through memorandum of understanding? 0.5 0 
 (I11)7 - Is central bank the explicitly mentioned macroprudential authority? 1 0 
Value for institutional arrangement  V(I11) = (I11)1+(I11)2+(I11)3+…+(I11)7 
I12 - Decision power 
 (I12)1 - Has the macroprudential authority a “hard” power, i.e. the direct control over the calibration of specific 
macroprudential tools? 
1 0 
 (I12)2 - Has the macroprudential authority a “semi-hard” power, that to make formal recommendations, coupled with a 
„comply or explain‟ mechanism? 
0.5 0 
 (I12)3 - Has the macroprudential authority a “soft” power, that to express an opinion, or a recommendation that is not subject 
to „comply or explain‟? 
0.25 0 
Value for decision power V(I12) = (I12)1+(I12)2+(I12)3 
Value for capacity of macroprudential policy governance V(I1) = V(I11) + V(I12) 
Source: authors‟ conception, following the methodology developed by Lombardi & Siklos (2016). 
 
According to the methodology used in ESRB (2014), the evaluation of the degree of compliance with the ESRB/2011/3 
is performed by scoring each sub-criterion included in the five recommendations, R, described in Table 2. The value for 
each recommendation R is average of the corresponding sub-criteria, and each sub-criterion is scored as follows: 1 
(fully compliant); 0,75 (largely compliant); 0,50 (partially compliant, i.e. actions taken only implement a part of the 
recommendation); 0,25 (materially non-compliant, i.e. actions taken only implement a small part of the 
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Table 2. Procedure for evaluating the criteria based on the ESRB/2011/3 Recommendation 
ESRB Criteria Formula Value*) 
R1 - Objective V(R1) = [V(R1)1 + V(R1)2]/2 V(R1) 
(R1)1 - The ultimate objective of macroprudential policy is specified as the safeguarding the stability of the financial system as a whole. V(R1)1 
(R1)2 - The macroprudential policies pursued upon the initiative of the national MA V(R1)2 
R2 - Institutional framework for macroprudential supervision V(R2) = [V(R2)1 + V(R2)2 + V(R2)3 + V(R2)4]/4 V(R2) 
(R2)1 - The conduct of macroprudential policy is entrusted to a designated authority in the national legislation. V(R2)1 
(R2)2 - The single macroprudential authority has mechanisms for cooperation among all authorities whose actions have a material impact 
on financial stability, without prejudice to their respective mandates. 
V(R2)2 
(R2)3 - The CB plays a leading role in the macroprudential policy. V(R2)3 
(R2)4 - The MA has the mandate to cooperate and to exchange information cross-border, in particular by informing the ESRB of the 
actions taken to address systemic risks at the national level. 
V(R2)4 
R3 - Tasks, powers, instruments V(R3) = [V(R3)1 + V(R3)2 + V(R3)3 + V(R3)4]/4 V(R3) 
(R3)1 - The macroprudential authority has tasks of identifying, monitoring, and assessing risks to financial stability and of implementing 
policies to achieve its objective by preventing and mitigating those risks. 
V(R3)1 
(R3)2 - The macroprudential authority has the power to require and obtain in a timely fashion all national data and information relevant 
for the exercise of its tasks. 
V(R3)2 
(R3)3 - The macroprudential authority has the power to designate and develop the surveillance approaches for identifying the financial 
institutions and structures that are systemically relevant at national level. 
V(R3)3 
(R3)4 - The macroprudential authority has the control over appropriate instruments for achieving its objectives. V(R3)4 
R4 - Transparency and accountability V(R4) = [V(R4)1 + V(R4)2 + V(R4)3 + V(R4)4]/4 V(R4) 
(R4)1 - The macroprudential policy decisions and their motivations are made public in a timely manner. The macroprudential policy 
strategies are set out and published by the macroprudential authority. 
V(R4)1 
(R4)2 - The macroprudential authority has the power to make public and private statements on systemic risk. V(R4)2 
(R4)3 - The macroprudential authority is ultimately accountable to the national parliament. V(R4)3 
(R4)4 - The macroprudential authority has legal protection when it acts in good faith. V(R4)4 
R5 - Independence V(R5) = [V(R5)1 + V(R5)2]/2 V(R5) 
(R5)1 - The macroprudential authority is operationally independent from political bodies and from the financial industry in pursuing its 
objectives. 
V(R5)1 
(R5)2 - The organizational and financial arrangements do not jeopardize the conduct of macroprudential policy. V(R5)2 
Average Score V(I3) = [V(R1) + V(R2) + V(R3) + V(R4) + V(R5)]/5 V(I3) 
Source: processing based on the methodology described in ESRB (2014). 
 
Finally, the index for the macroprudential policy (MPI) is obtained as the sum of the three criteria, as follows: 
MPI = V(I1) + V(I2) + V(I3) (1) 
Where:  V(I1) is the value of the capacity for macroprudential policy governance; V(I2) is the value of the “activism” of 
macroprudential authority in applying ESRB Recommendation; V(I3) as the average score of the five ESRB criteria. 
The values for I1 and I2 are obtained by cumulating the values of each sub-criterion mentioned in Table 1.  
For the interinstitutional coordination mechanism at the level of a macroprudential policy committee - the maximum score 
(4.00) is given to the situation in which the central bank has the main role, as the sum of (I11)1, (I11)2, (I11)3 and (I11)4. The 
minimum (theoretical) value is registered if there is no coordinating body for macroprudential policy, and central bank is 
single institution that has this responsibility (1.00). For the decision power, the maximum score is 1.75 points, if the 
macroprudential authority has all three types of decision-making powers. The minimum score for this sub-criterion is 0.25, 
when the macroprudential authority has only the power to express an opinion, or a recommendation that is not subject to 
„comply or explain‟. It follows that for the capacity for macroprudential policy governance, the maximum score is 5.75, 
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and the minimum one is 1.25. 
For the criterion referred to the “activism” of the macroprudential authority, the maximum value is 1.00, when all nineteen 
types of macroprudential instruments classified according to ESRB are applied or assumed by the authority. The 
maximum score for the degree of complying with ESRB/2011/3 Recommendation is 1.00, when all the five criteria are 
met (recommendations A, B, C, D, E). The minimum values for these two criteria are considered 0. Therefore, the 
maximum and minimum theoretical value for all criteria is 7.75, and 1.25, respectively. 
5. Results and Discussion  
The values of macroprudential policy index for Euro Area candidate countries are displayed in Table 3, and the details on 
the values calculated for each criterion and sub-criterion are presented in the Appendix (Table 4, Table 5 and Table 6). 
As a general overview, Hungary and Croatia register the highest scores of MPI, above 6.5, whereas Poland has the lowest 
value, less than 4.00. Looking at the values for each criterion that compose the macroprudential index, there are noticed 
differences across the analysed countries, and thus it is important to analyse each criterion, separately. 
 
Table 3. The macroprudential policy index values for Euro Area candidate countries 
Criteria Bulgaria Croatia Czechia Hungary Poland Romania 
I1 - Capacity for macroprudential policy 
governance 
4.25 5.25 3.00 5.25 2.75 4.50 
I2 - The “activism” of authority in 
using/assuming the ESRB instruments 
0.63 0.32 0.47 0.42 0.47 0.53 
I3 - Complying with the ESRB/2011/3 
Recommendation 
0.67 1.00 0.96 0.96 0.45 0.75 
MPI 5.55 6.57 4.43 6.63 3.67 5.78 
Source: Authors‟ calculation based on methodology presented in Table 1, Table 2, ESRB (2014), and IMF (n.d.). 
 
A more suggestive picture for comparison between countries is rendered by normalizing the data, as shown in Figure 1. 
Data are normalized considering, as references, the maximum and minimum (theoretical) values for each criterion, as it is 
described above. The general score is the sum of values for each criterion. 
 
Figure 1. The macroprudential policy index for the Euro Area candidate countries (normalized data) 
Source: data on Table 3 
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It can be observed that Poland has the lowest values for all three criteria, while Czechia, but also Croatia and Hungary, 
have greater differences between criteria. 
4.1 Capacity for Macroprudential Policy Governance  
The values of the capacity for macroprudential governance indicator range from 2.75 for Poland, to 5.25 for Croatia and 
Hungary (see Table 3 and Figure 2). The contribution of the two elements that define this indicator also varies across 
countries.  
 
Figure 2. Capacity for macroprudential governance in the Euro Area candidate countries 
Source: data on Table 4 (Appendix). 
 
All countries, excepting Czechia, have a coordinating body for macroprudential policy (Table 4, in the Appendix). This 
feature is reflected by a lower value for institutional arrangement (1.5, the lowest value across these countries) given that 
the Czech National Bank is the sole owner for financial stability and macroprudential mandate. In Czechia, the central 
bank is designated as a macroprudential authority, but there are no committee within or outside the central bank, and there 
is no interagency coordination mechanism. Instead, Croatia gains a maximum score for the institutional arrangement, 
followed by Hungary (see Figure 2).  
In terms of decision-making power, in Hungary, the macroprudential authority has the highest score covering “hard”, 
“semi-hard” and “soft” levels of power, followed by Czechia and Romania. It is noticed that all countries, except Poland, 
have the direct control over the calibration of specific macroprudential tools (“hard” power). Moreover, in Croatia and 
Bulgaria, the macroprudential authority has no power in making formal recommendations coupled with a „comply or 
explain‟ mechanism. 
Poland gets the lowest score, the macroprudential authority having only the power to make formal recommendations, 
coupled with a „comply or explain‟ mechanism (Table 4, in the Appendix).  
4.2 Activism of Macroprudential Authority in Using or Assuming the ESRB Instruments  
According to data for this criterion (I2), Bulgaria has the highest score (see Table 3), as the number of macroprudential 
instruments reflects not only those already applied, but also some instruments declared by Bulgarian National Bank to be 
activated when necessary. All countries have activated capital buffers, as it can be seen in Table 5, in the Appendix. The 
borrower-based measures are already used in Czechia, Romania, and Poland, and in Bulgaria they are currently only 
assumed by the Bulgarian National Bank as it is mentioned in IMF (n.d.). Although Croatia has a long history in using 
macroprudential instruments (see Dumičić, 2018 and Dimova et al., 2016), it has a narrow range of active 
macroprudential tools, because it has not activated yet the borrower-based measures. 
Beyond these observations, the macroprudential policy “activism” can be viewed as an indicator that reflects the extent to 
which macroprudential policy becomes a key instrument for managing national macroeconomic equilibrium. This 
activism should be analysed together with the decision-making capacity of macroprudential authorities. In this context, 
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although Poland has an active position in using macroprudential instruments, the decision-making power is limited, as we 
already mentioned above. 
4.3 Complying with the ESRB Recommendation on the Macroprudential Mandate of National Authorities 
Croatia has the highest score concerning the degree of complying with the ESRB/2011/3 Recommendation, followed 
close by Czechia and Hungary. A lower level has Bulgaria and Romania, but the minimum level is registered by Poland 
(see Figure 3 and Table 3). 
Differences between countries concerning the general degree of complying with ESRB Recommendation are also 
maintained at the level of each five criteria included in this ESRB Recommendation (see Table 6, in the Appendix).  
 
Figure 3. Complying the Euro Area candidate countries with the ESRB/2011//3 Recommendation 
Source: data on Table 6 (Appendix). 
 
Overall, the Euro Area candidate countries have quite different levels of macroprudential policy index: the highest values 
are registered for Hungary and Croatia, and the weakest are in the case of Poland. Considering these results in terms of 
preparing for accession to the Euro Area, Hungary and Croatia are the best prepared countries in terms of using 
macroprudential policy as a possible shock-management instrument in the event of joining the Euro Area. They have not 
only a greater capacity to lead and use the macroprudential policy, as a tool for managing macroeconomic imbalances, but 
also a higher degree of complying with ESRB Recommendation on the macroprudential mandate of national authorities.  
We must observe that, although the general score for Czechia is lower than those obtained by Hungary or Croatia, 
following the lack of a coordinating body in terms of macroprudential policy and financial stability, its national 
macroprudential policy becomes a relevant tool in macroeconomic decision making. This is reflected by both the decision 
power, the activism in using macroprudential instruments, and the higher degree of complying with ESRB/2011/3 
Recommendation concerning the institutional framework for macroprudential supervision. 
Romania, Bulgaria, and Poland are in the lower position concerning both the overall capacity for macroprudential policy 
and the degree of complying with ESRB Recommendation on the macroprudential mandate of national authorities. 
Nevertheless, Romania has the best score among those three countries, and thus it can be more prepared to use 
macroprudential policy as an adjustment tool in case of asymmetric shocks or imbalances. 
It is important to notice that although Bulgaria is closer to the Euro Area, from the perspective of the monetary policy 
regime, it does not have a high level regarding the capacity of macroprudential policy governance, or the “convergence” 
degree for ESRB/2011/3 Recommendation. However, Poland has the lowest score for both these criteria and thus it 
should strengthen its position on the macroprudential authority, in order to adapt to future challenges, especially in the 
context of preparing for accession to the Euro Area. 
The macroprudential policy index provides an overview of how the countries analysed have set up their governing in this 
area and how active the macroprudential authorities are. Nevertheless, a more detailed analysis would be needed to 
capture the specific objectives stated or the intensity of the application of macroprudential measures, as well as the 
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conduct of the policy, as a direction of action (easing measure or restrictive measures). Such elements, integrated into a 
more complex indicator, could show a new dimension of macroprudential policy, but it remains a possible research topic 
in the future. 
5. Concluding Remarks 
Implementing the national macroprudential policy is challenging for a currency area, but its significance is even greater 
for Euro Area, given the high degree of heterogeneity of its member states, as it could be used as macroeconomic 
instrument for adjusting local imbalances. In this regard, the national macroprudential policy should be an important 
pillar of the local macroeconomic framework, compensating to some extent for the loss of flexibility previously offered 
by the national monetary policy. 
Considering this, Euro Area candidate countries should include in their national macroeconomic strategies the objective 
of strengthening the role and capacity of macroprudential policy in managing local disequilibrium. Thereby, this policy 
serves as a tool to compensate monetary instruments, which will be lost once the country joined the Euro Area. This 
capacity improvement concerns both the organization of the management of the national macroprudential policy and the 
distribution of responsibility between the authorities, as well as the use of specific tools in order to manage 
macroeconomic shocks. 
The analysis is based on a general framework for assessing the capacity of macroprudential policy, taking into account 
several criteria relevant to these countries, integrated into an index of macroprudential policy. Our findings show that 
the Euro Area candidate countries have quite different levels of macroprudential policy capacity - the highest values are 
in the case of Hungary and Croatia, and the weakest are in the case of Poland. Interpreted in terms of preparing for 
accession to the Euro Area, these results show that Hungary and Croatia are the best prepared countries for using and 
managing macroprudential policy as a possible shock-absorber instrument, while Poland with the lowest values of 
criteria should strengthen its position on the macroprudential authority. Moreover, although Bulgaria is closer to the 
Euro Area, by its monetary policy regime, it has a lower level regarding the index of macroprudential policy.  
Nevertheless, this approach is only an initiation in analysis of the capacity of macroprudential policy, an area necessary to 
be extended by adding and refining criteria that reflect as accurately as possible the nature of macroprudential policy in 
these countries. 
The issue of assessing the capacity of macroprudential policy should be included in the field dedicated to the analysis of 
preparing an economy for accession to a monetary union, along with other established criteria, including those of the 
theory of optimum currency areas or the theory of European integration. 
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Appendix 
Table 4. Data on the capacity for macroprudential policy governance in Euro Area candidate countries 
 Bulgaria Croatia Czechia Hungary Poland Romania 
I11 Institutional arrangement 3.00 4.00 1.5 3.5 2.0 3.00 
(I11)1 – Is there a financial stability/macroprudential 
coordinating body? 
1 1 0 1 1 1 
(I11)2 – Is the central bank a member? 1 1 n.a. 1 1 1 
(I11)3 - Does central bank chair coordination body? 0 1 n.a. 0.5 0 1 
(I11)4 – If no body - Does central bank share 
financial stability/macroprudential mandate? 
n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(I11)5 - If no body - Is central bank sole owner of 
the mandate? 
n.a. n.a. 0 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(I11)6 - If no body - is there implicit coordination 
through memorandum of understanding? 
n.a. n.a. 0.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 
(I11)7 - Is central bank the explicitly mentioned 
macroprudential authority? 
1 1 1 1 0 0 
I12 Decision power of macroprudential authority 1.25 1.25 1.5 1.75 0.75 1.5 
(I13)1 - “hard power” 1 1 1 1 0 1 
(I13)2 - “semi-hard” power 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
(I13)3 – “soft” power 0.25 0.25 0 0.25 0.25 n.a. 
Source: Authors‟ calculation based on methodology presented in Table 1, and IMF (n.d.) available at 
https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/Reports.aspx (data accessed: 10 November 2020). 
 
Table 5. Macroprudential instruments available to the national macroprudential authority, according to ESRB 
classification 
 
Bulgaria Croatia Czechia Hungary Poland Romania 
Capital Buffers 
 Capital Conservation Buffer x x x x x x 
 Countercyclical Capital Buffer x x x x x x 
 Global Systemically Important Institution 
Buffer 
      
 Other Systemically Important Institution 
Buffer 
x x x x x x 
 Systemic Risk Buffer x x x x  x 
Borrower-based 
measures*) 
 Debt-service-to-income x 
 
x x x x 
 Loan-to-income x      
 Loan-to-value x  x x x x 
 Debt-to-income x  x    






 Leverage ratio 
      
 Liquidity ratio x   x x  
 Loan amortisation       
 Loss-given-default       
 Loan-to-deposit       
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Bulgaria Croatia Czechia Hungary Poland Romania 
 Pillar II       
 Risk weights  x   x x 
 Stress test x  x   x 
 Other x x 
 
x x x 
Total instruments 12 6 9 8 9 10 
Source: Based on data available at: https://www.esrb.europa.eu/national_policy/html/index.en.html, last updated, 16 
October 2020, and IMF (n.d.) available at https://www.elibrary-areaer.imf.org/Macroprudential/Pages/Reports.aspx 
(data accessed: 19 November 2020). 
 
Table 6. The degree of compliance with ESRB/2011/3 Recommendation in Euro Area candidate countries 
 
Bulgaria Czechia Croatia Hungary Poland Romania 
R1 – Objective 0.75 0.88 1.00 1.00 0.38 0.75 
(R1)1 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.25 0.75 
(R1)2  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
R2 - Institutional framework for macroprudential supervision 0.67 1.00 1.00 0.94 0.50 0.75 
(R2)1  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
(R2)2 n.a. 1.00 n.a. 1.00 n.a. n.a.  
(R2)3  0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
(R2)4  0.50 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.75 
R3 - Tasks. powers. instruments 0.75 0.94 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
(R3)1  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
(R3)2  1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
(I63)3 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
(I63)4 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
R4 - Transparency and accountability 0.56 1.00 1.00 0.88 0.38 0.75 
(R4)1 0.75 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.00 0.75 
(R4)2  0.50 1.00 1.00 0.75 0.50 0.75 
(R4)3 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
(R4)4 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
R5 - Independence 0.63 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
(R5)1 0.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
(R5)2  0.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.50 0.75 
Average Score  0.67 0.96 1.00 0.96 0.45 0.75 
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